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I. INTRODUCTION
With the strokes of twenty-two pens, President Barack Obama on
March 23, 2010, signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA), ushering in a legislative overhaul of the U.S.
health-care system unseen in decades.2 At the signing ceremony, the
President cherished the historical value of the event, speaking won-
drously about the legislative victory. "The bill I'm signing will set in
motion reforms that generations of Americans have fought for and
marched for and hungered to see," the President said. "Today, we are
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of
Miami School of Law; B.S., 2007, Virginia Commonwealth University. I thank Professor Mary I.
Coombs for her thorough advising and feedback on previous drafts of this casenote. I also thank
my family, Komal Vaidya, and the University of Miami Law Review for their encouragement and
support.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.
html?_r-1.
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affirming that essential truth, a truth every generation is called to redis-
cover for itself, that we are not a nation that scales back its aspirations."3
For opponents of the legislation, the President's rhetorical grandeur
was not enough to sustain even a moment of national unity or nonparti-
sanship. Only minutes after the President's signing, more than a dozen
state attorneys general, with Attorney General Bill McCollum of Florida
at the helm, filed suit in federal court to challenge the PPACA.4 Alleg-
ing that the Act exceeds the scope of Congress's Article I powers and
violates the Tenth Amendment,' the pending lawsuit constructs the Con-
stitution, which courts have disavowed as a guarantor to an affirmative
right to health care, 6 as a tool to preclude the statutory formation of a
universal health-care system. Although this construction is debatable,
the attorneys' general attack on the PPACA is nevertheless a formidable
one, which eventually could make its way before the U.S. Supreme
Court.
In the meantime, smaller-scale battles in the courts suggest that the
Constitution is not such a complete bar to statutory rights to health care.
In one novel federal appeals case, Franklin Memorial Hospital v. Har-
vey,' the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked with a two-fold
inquiry under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: whether
Maine statutes that require all hospitals to provide free medical services
to the indigent, particularly in conjunction with the state's reimburse-
ment rate under its Medicaid program, amounted to uncompensated tak-
ings of a hospital's private property.' Responding in the negative, the
court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for the
defendant, Maine Department of Health and Human Services Commis-
sioner Brenda M. Harvey, on the free-care claim and also affirmed dis-
missal of the Medicaid claim.' The court's holding is notable because it
suggests that, to the extent that the Fifth Amendment forecloses takings
claims once some other source of law gives life to a basic right to health
care, the Constitution indeed, albeit indirectly, may authorize this
right. 'o
3. Id.
4. See Complaint, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No.
3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010).
5. Id. at 15-20.
6. See, e.g., Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.
1987) ("[W]e can discern no general right, based upon either the Constitution or federal statutes,
to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or municipality.").
7. 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
8. Id. at 123.
9. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009), affg No. 07-125-B-S,
2008 WL 4936403 (D. Me. Nov. 14, 2008).
10. The right to health care for purposes here is the right to medically necessary inpatient and
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Franklin Memorial is notable, furthermore, because of the back-
drop against which the First Circuit adjudicated. As the first decade of
the new millennium drew to a close, the very notion of a right to health
care was up for debate as Congress deliberated whether to drastically
expand health-insurance coverage before finally passing the PPACA."I
Meanwhile, the severe current downturn in the U.S. economy has only
amplified the stakes in federal and state reform efforts. And, at the same
time, the recent recession has placed some health-care providers, partic-
ularly hospitals like Franklin Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff in Frank-
lin Memorial, at an uncertain crossroads. "[H]ospital investment
portfolios have lost value like everyone else's, donors are scaling back
their philanthropy, patients are deferring expensive elective procedures
that normally provide a big chunk of revenue, and an increasing number
of unemployed, uninsured patients is showing up in emergency rooms
needing free or discounted care."l 2 The situation, by all appearances, is a
"perfect storm.""
The conditions for hospitals across the country have been equally
precarious in Maine, the so-called "Charlie Brown of health care"
because of the shortcomings of its reform measures, which have
included the creation of a state-sponsored health insurance plan and
expanded Medicaid eligibility.' 4 Primarily at issue in Franklin Memorial
were Maine's recently liberalized laws that mandate free hospital care,
outpatient care at a hospital. This right is dissimilar from, but subsumes, the more fundamental
right to emergency care at a hospital. Courts have protected statutory schemes that guarantee this
latter right (and, inversely, that impose a duty of care on health-care providers) from takings
claims, thus supporting the conclusion that the Takings Clause is not necessarily a limitation on
statutory rights to health care. See Burditt v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d
1362, 1376 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
against a takings claim); St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 786 P.2d 983, 987-89
(Ariz. 1989) (rejecting the notion that an indigency calculation pursuant to a state statute, together
with a state statutory requirement that hospitals provide emergency treatment to patients
regardless of ability to pay, constituted a taking under the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions); see
also Gary E. Jones, Regulatory Takings and Emergency Medical Treatment, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 145 (2010).
11. For a timeline of developments leading up to the passage of the PPACA, see Elisabeth
Goodridge & Sarah Arnquist, A History of Overhauling Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/19/us/politics/20090717_HEALTHTIMELINE.
html?ref=healthcare reform.
12. Kyla Jones, Economy Takes Toll on Charity Care, AAMC REP. (Ass'n of Am. Med.
Coils., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2009, available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/nov09/
economy.htm.
13. Id.
14. Gardiner Harris, Maine Finds a Health Care Fix Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/health/policy/I lmaine.html?scp=1&sq=maine%20finds%20
a%20health%20care%20fix%20elusive&st=cse. Despite these reforms, Maine continues to
grapple with health-insurance premiums that are unaffordable for many, high health-care spending
per person, and crowded emergency rooms. Id.
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which is medical treatment that a hospital or other health-care organiza-
tion provides without the expectation of payment.' 5 Many states have
some variation of free-care laws, 16 but as the First Circuit noted,
Maine's free care laws are unique in that (1) the laws mandate that a
hospital provide free/uncompensated care to persons deemed eligible
by the state through a penalty enforcement scheme, (2) the hospital is
not reimbursed any amount for the provision of free care, [and (3)]
the provision of free care is not a license condition [and] is not linked
to the state's certificate of need process."
Pursuant to these laws, the hospital in Franklin Memorial watched the
ranks of free-care patients increase" concurrent with adverse develop-
ments in the economy, much as hospitals across the country have faced a
greater demand for costly care by patients who are unable to pay for
their treatment.' 9
In this context, Franklin challenged its burden to care for Maine's
poorest residents by seeking a declaratory judgment that the state's free-
care laws and Medicaid payment scheme contravened the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against uncompensated takings of private property.20
The hospital thus evoked Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York2 1 and subsequent Supreme Court case law governing regula-
tory-takings claims. In characterizing Franklin Memorial Hospital's
free-care takings claim in particular, the Franklin Memorial court said
that "in FMH's view, Maine's free care laws are not a form of price
control but instead direct the transfer of property from the hospitals to
low-income patients."2 2
This casenote agrees with most of the First Circuit's analysis under
the Penn Central regime. It further concludes that, even if the court had
scrutinized Maine's free-care laws under a price-control analysis, it
would have reached the same result. Moreover, this note maintains that
15. See Curry. CATALYST, NOT THERE WHEN You NEED IT: THE SEARCH FOR FREE HOsPrrAL
CARE 23 (2003) [hereinafter SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE].
16. See CMTY. CATALYST, FREE CARE: A COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS (2003) [hereinafter
COMPENDIUM] (summarizing free-care laws and regulations in the United States).
17. Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 2009).
18. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *2 (D. Me.),
aff'd, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4936403 (D. Me. Nov. 14, 2008), af'd, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir.
2009).
19. See AM. Hosp. Ass'N, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TOLL ON THE PATIENTS AND
COMMUNITIES HOSPITALS SERVE 3 (2009) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CRISIS] (reporting that seventy
percent of respondent community hospitals saw an increase in uncompensated care as a percent of
total gross revenues from March of 2008 to March of 2009).
20. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 123.
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 127.
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some of the policy concerns about free care underlying Franklin Memo-
rial will continue to exist even in the wake of the PPACA.
The structure of this note is five-part. Part II introduces free care
and overviews Penn Central and other regulatory-takings case law,
which forms a framework for understanding the First Circuit's decision
in Franklin Memorial. Part III details the facts, procedure, holding, and
reasoning of the case. Part IV elaborates on the court's discussion of the
role of a hospital's nonprofit status under Penn Central. Offering an
alternative analysis of Franklin Memorial, Part V lays out the reasons
why Franklin's free-care takings claim would have been untenable even
if it had argued that Maine's free-care laws paralleled a price control.
Finally, Part VI comments on the supply of and demand for free care in
light of Congress's historical stride toward securing health-insurance
coverage for millions of Americans with the passage of the PPACA.
1I. PUTTING FRANKLINi MEMORIAL IN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Purpose and Origins of Free Care
Also known as charity care, free care is medical treatment for
which a hospital or other health-care provider does not expect to be
paid.2 3 "Bad debt," in contrast, reflects services for which a hospital
expects to be paid but, for one reason or another, usually a patient's
inability to pay, the hospital does not receive payment.2 4 Aggregately,
free care and bad debt make up "uncompensated care."2 5 A consumer-
watchdog group, which supports wider free-care availability, stresses
that characterization of money owed for medical treatment "makes an
enormous difference to the uninsured or underinsured person" because
an expectation of payment invariably leads to efforts to collect money or
assets that seldom exist.2 6 The American Hospital Association, however,
calls this divide "arbitrary at best," stating that hospitals have practical
23. SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 15, at 23.
24. Id. Franklin Memorial illustrates how a hospital may garner expectations of payment. The
hospital there had a billing process whereby an expectation of payment formed depending on
where a patient fell between 150 percent and 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines.
Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 24,
2008). If a patient fell below the lowest percentage, the hospital would have no expectation of
payment for care; in other words, the hospital would regard such care as "free care" as this
casenote uses the phrase. Contrastingly, if a patient fell anywhere above the lowest percentage, the
hospital still might supply some level of free care; but, depending on where the patient fell along
the spectrum, the hospital would expect some degree of payment. Any nonpayment would be "bad
debt." In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2006, Franklin Memorial Hospital reported $2,899,056 in
bad debt. Id.
25. Am. HosP. Ass'N, UNCOMPENSATED HosPITAL CARE COST FAcT SHEET 1 (2009)
[hereinafter UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE].
26. SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 15, at 23.
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difficultly in splitting bad debt from charity care because the medically
indigent and underinsured generate both bad debt and charity-care
costs.27
The primary beneficiaries of free care nevertheless are mostly
undifferentiated: the uninsured.28 As the economic recession that began
in late 2007 has shed jobs and, with them, health-insurance coverage,
this group grew from 46.3 million people in 2008 to 50.7 million people
in 2009.29 Characteristically, the majority of today's uninsured are poor
or near poor nonelderly adults, who are usually at higher risk of serious
illnesses than the general population.3 0 Most of these people are ineligi-
ble for public health-insurance coverage under Medicaid because, for
example, they are without dependent children.3 ' With few other options,
the uninsured are left to fall back on free care as their "ultimate safety
net." 32
The institutions and individuals that comprise the safety net vary.
They include public and nonprofit hospitals, community health centers,
public health-department clinics, rural health clinics, free clinics, and
some physician practices. 3 3 Of these, community-health centers and
public hospitals are two of the "largest and most visible elements."34
These latter two establishments serve largely uninsured and publicly
insured people and provide a range of inpatient and outpatient services.
Whereas community health centers tend to offer their low-income popu-
lations diverse medical and non-medical services, such as interpreter and
27. UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 25, at 2.
28. SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 15, at 23. The underinsured also add to the
demand for free care. This group, which comprises people whose health insurance does not
adequately cover their medical expenses, numbered 25 million people in 2007, up sixty percent
from 2003. Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003
and 2007, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.4.
w298v1?ijkey=rhRn2Tr4HAKZ.&keytype=ref&siteid=healthaff. Maine's free-care laws appear to
address the problem of underinsurance by instructing that "any amount remaining due after
payment by the insurer or medical assistance program will be considered free care." 10-144-150
ME. CODE R. § 1.05(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
29. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-238, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 22 (2010).
30. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 4 (2009).
31. Id. at 19. Medicaid is a hybrid state and federal public health-insurance program for
certain low-income groups, such as the disabled and pregnant. Medicaid Program-General
Information, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/
MedicaidGenInfo/ (last modified Mar. 29, 2010).
32. SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 15, at 23.
33. Bruce Siegel, Marsha Regenstein & Peter Shin, Health Reform and the Safety Net: Big
Opportunities; Major Risks, 32 J.L. MED. & Emics 426, 426 (2004); see id. (discussing various
conceptions of the "safety net").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 427.
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child-care services, public and other safety-net hospitals tend to supply
emergency-department services and high-cost specialized care to their
large proportion of Medicare patients.36
A variety of sources may obligate or incentivize these hospitals and
others to offer this safety net. Perhaps most fundamentally, hospitals'
traditional role as caregivers may goad them to supply free care. Until
the twentieth century, hospitals catered to the poor, who were unable to
afford physician visits at home.3 7 Today, these historical underpinnings
may live on in hospitals' stated principles of corporate social
responsibility."
Externally, as Franklin Memorial exemplifies, a state may require
hospitals to provide a minimum threshold of free care by statute or regu-
lation." State laws of this sort differ across many factors, such as termi-
nology, eligibility requirements, and funding source (if any). Among
other approaches, states may distribute "earmarked" funds from public
uncompensated care pools to hospitals;4 0 attach a duty to provide free
36. Id. Medicare is a federal public health-insurance program with various components
regarding hospital, medical, and prescription-drug coverage. Medicare Program-General
Information, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/
MedicareGenInfo/ (last modified Dec. 14, 2005). It chiefly covers people age sixty-five and older.
Id.
37. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical
Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 (1993).
38. More than 4200 hospitals have committed to the American Hospital Association's
Statement of Principles and Guidelines regarding hospital billing and collection practices for the
uninsured and underinsured. See BD. OF TRS., AM. Hosp. Ass'N, HOSPITAL BILLING AND
COLLECTION PRACTICES (2003).
39. Free-care laws are related to, but not synonymous with, federal and state emergency-care
laws. See supra note 10. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, for example,
requires that Medicare-participating hospitals provide a medical screening examination to any
individual seeking treatment who arrives at a hospital's emergency department. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(a) (2006). If the screening confirms an emergency medical condition, the hospital must
stabilize the condition or transfer the patient to a more appropriate hospital. § 1395dd(b)(1).
Although EMTALA applies to any individual, regardless of indigency, and hospitals may not
delay screening or stabilizing a patient to "inquire about the individual's method of payment or
insurance status," § 1395dd(h), the statute does not stop hospitals from later charging for their
services. See, e.g., Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (W.D. Pa. 2005) ("EMTALA does
not forbid a hospital from inquiring into a patient's ability to pay for treatment, so long as its
inquiry does not delay screening or treatment."). EMTALA is further limited in that treatment is
required only up to stabilization, and it does not cover nonemergency conditions. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.24(d)(2)(i)-(ii) (2009). Thus, free-care laws theoretically may exceed emergency-care laws
insofar as the rights that they grant to patients. Treatment that a hospital supplies pursuant to an
emergency-care law, however, may become a form of uncompensated care if the hospital
attempts, but fails, to collect payment for emergency screening or stabilization.
40. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 59.1 (2004). To lessen the financial impact on hospitals
that provide concentrated amounts of charity care, public uncompensated care pools draw together
a uniform surcharge from hospitals and distribute the resulting funds relative to hospitals'
provision of charity care. RANDALL R. BOVB3JERG ET AL., URBAN INST., MARKET COMPETITION
AND UNCOMPENSATED CARE PoOLS 5 (2000).
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care as a condition to licensure4 1 or to certificate of need;42 and "lend"
public dollars for charitable care by allowing a hospital or county to
attach a lien to a charity-care patient's property.4 3 Because they do not
feature any of these provisions, Maine's free-care laws are relatively
indigent-friendly and potentially more onerous on hospitals.4 4
Another major impetus for free-care is the tax-exempt status of
nonprofit hospitals.4 5 Nonprofit status bestows hospitals organized as
such with a right to access tax-exempt bond debt, in addition to a host of
lucrative federal, state, and local tax exemptions.4 6 These entitlements
are provisional, of course; the presumption is that, in return for their tax
exemption, nonprofit hospitals confer public-health benefits, which the
government itself would have to provide in their absence.47
At the federal level, for example, the Internal Revenue Service uses
what is recognized as the "community benefits" standard to appraise
hospitals' income-tax exemption.4 8 The 1969 ruling that gave rise to this
standard deems a nonprofit hospital a public-charity institution, which is
exempt from the federal income tax, provided that it furnishes signifi-
cant benefits to its local community.4 9 Free care is one benefit under this
standard, but other services that are less directly related to patient care,
such as health fairs, also may count as community benefits.5 o
In addition to state funds and tax savings, hospitals may access
other resources to support charity care. Hospitals that bear charity-care
loads that are disproportionate to other hospitals' may be eligible for
federal Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital funds.5  Nonprofit
hospitals also may receive tax-deductible funds from private donors,
41. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-17-43 (West 2010).
42. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 61-15-202(2)(c)(1) (2010).
43. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-3504(4) (West 2010).
44. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 16 (categorizing Maine as a "consumer friendly" state for
free-care patients).
45. Nonprofits make up the vast majority of hospitals in the United States. See Fast Facts on
US Hospitals, Am. Hosp. Ass'N, http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/
FastFactsNov_ I 1_2009.pdf (last updated June 24, 2010).
46. Jack Hanson, Are We Getting Our Money's Worth? Charity Care, Community Benefits,
and Tax Exemption at Nonprofit Hospitals, 17 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 395, 397 (2005).
47. Id.
48. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. In many states, exemption from the federal
income tax qualifies nonprofit hospitals for exemption from the state income tax as well. Hanson,
supra note 46, at 410.
49. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
50. Id.
51. Disproportionate Share Hospital payments are the federal government's primary source of
funding uncompensated care. CHRISTINE PROVOST PETERS, NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM,
MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HosPrrAL (DSH) PAYMENTS 1 (2009). In fiscal year 2009,
an expected $11.3 billion of the projected $216 billion federal Medicaid budget was allocated for
Disproportionate Share Hospital payments. Id.
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who may direct that their donations go toward charity care.52
B. "Ad Hoc Inquiries" and Per Se Rules: Modem
Takings Jurisprudence
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."" The purpose of this constitutional guarantee is to "bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."" This
reasoning implies, of course, that the clause is not an absolute bar to the
government imposing burdens on some people. As Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes observed in the first regulatory-takings case, Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon," "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without pay-
ing for such change in the general law."
Mahon established that government regulations, as well as govern-
ment actions of appropriation or destruction, are subject to Takings
Clause review.5 6 The Court in that case concluded that the state statute
in dispute, which prohibited subsidence coalmining under residential
areas, was a taking of the property of a company with a right in coal
underlying the Mahon family's house." The Court reasoned that protec-
tion against public nuisance did not justify the statute under the facts at
hand because only a single family's residence was liable to suffer dam-
age from the mining.58 Moreover, personal safety did not justify the stat-
ute because notice of a company's intent to mine under a house, which
the Pennsylvania Coal Co. had provided to the Mahons, was sufficient to
avert personal injury.59 By contrast, the Court depicted the "extent of the
diminution" in value of the coal as "great," where the statute deprived
the company of the entire pillar of coal stabilizing the house.6 0 Thus, on
balance, the Court concluded that the "statute does not disclose a public
52. The health-care sector received $22.46 billion in charitable giving in 2009. GIvINGUSA
FOUND., GIVING USA 2010: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2009, at 12
(2010). This is a growth of 3.8 percent from 2008 to 2009, maintaining the health-care sector's
rank as the fifth largest recipient of charitable giving among recipient organizations. Id. at 13,
18-19.
53. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Takings Clause binds state and local governments by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
54. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
55. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
56. Id. at 414-15.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 413-14.
59. Id. at 414.
60. Id.
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interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defen-
dant's constitutionally protected rights."6 1 The Court's ruling, how-
ever-"if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking" 62 -
offered little guidance for future courts.
More than fifty years later, the Court elaborated its regulatory-tak-
ings jurisprudence in Penn Central. The case concerned a New York
City "landmark" designation on the famous Grand Central Terminal,
whose owners opposed the limitations on the use of the property that
came with the recognition. 63 The Court's analysis proceeded with this
oft-cited summary of its takings case law:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular signifi-
cance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant con-
siderations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.'
Applying these factors, the Court rejected Penn Central's claim that
a taking had occurred.6 5 According to the Court, Penn Central's contin-
ued ability to use and profit from the structure as a train station, together
with the potentiality to construct a smaller building on the station or to
transfer airspace rights to other nearby properties, moderated the eco-
nomic impact of the landmark designation.6 6 In regard to investment-
backed expectations, the Court reasoned that the foremost expectation
concerning the terminal-that it would operate as a transportation hub-
was undisturbed.6 7 Finally, the Court determined that the landmark des-
ignation was substantially related to the promotion of the general wel-
fare and was not a physical appropriation of the building by the city.68
Since Penn Central, the Court has carved out certain regulatory
actions as per se takings. The Franklin Memorial court addressed the
exceptions from two cases: Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.69 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.70 In the for-
mer case, a state statute had authorized cable-television companies to
install cables and infrastructure on residential rental properties without a
61. Id.
62. Id. at 415.
63. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1978).
64. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id. at 136-37.
67. Id. at 136.
68. Id. at 131-35.
69. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
70. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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landlord's permission." The Court determined that the permanent instal-
lation of equipment on Loretto's apartment building was akin to the gov-
ernment's itself appropriating a portion of the property.7 2 The Court thus
ruled that a "permanent physical occupation authorized by government
is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve."73 In
Lucas, a state statute banned all construction along a certain stretch of
beach. In reviewing the law, the Court concentrated on the economic-
impact factor from Penn Central and concluded that "when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically benefi-
cial uses in the name of the common good . . . he has suffered a tak-
ing."7 Applying this standard, the Court decided that the statute resulted
in the taking of property developer Lucas's property rights in his beach-
front residential lots."
Recently, the Court expressed its continued adherence to Penn Cen-
tral and the exceptions to its ad hoc standard. In Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc.,76 the Court offered the following explanation of how Penn
Central, Loretto, and Lucas interconnect:
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be character-
ized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and
Penn Central) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify reg-
ulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses
directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes
upon private property rights.7
III. FRANKLIN MEMORIAL HoSPITAL v. HARVEY: No RECOURSE
UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE FROM MAINE'S FREE-CARE
LAWS AND MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT RATE
The challenged rules in Franklin Memorial are part of a set of stat-
utory and regulatory laws that collectively form Maine's free-care
laws.7 ' At their core, these laws state that "[n]o hospital shall deny ser-
71. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
72. Id. at 438.
73. Id. at 426.
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. The Court did except from this per se rule situations where
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance" justify a regulation. Id. at
1029.
75. Id. at 1031-32. The Court remanded for a finding whether South Carolina common law
supported prohibiting the development of Lucas's land. Id. at 1031. The Court, however, opined
that it was "unlikely" to justify this prohibition. Id.
76. 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
77. Id.
78. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, H§ 1715-16 (2004); 10-144-150 ME. CODE R.
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vices to any Maine resident solely because of the inability of the individ-
ual to pay for those services." 7 9 The term "services" broadly
encompasses all "medically necessary inpatient and outpatient ser-
vices."so The Maine Department of Health and Human Services, which
issues guidelines for hospitals to follow in their free-care policies,
including guidelines about income eligibility to receive free care, over-
sees compliance with this mandate."' As the First Circuit noted, the laws
together are distinctive in that they apply to all for-profit and nonprofit
hospitals and are not linked to licensure or certificate of need;8 2 the state
does not directly pay a hospital for any free care that it provides; the
state attorney general or any affected patient may file an enforcement
suit against a noncompliant hospital; and a noncompliant hospital may
have to pay a penalty fee." Although at first blush these laws might
seem burdensome on hospitals whose patient bases are mostly indigent
and eligible for free care, an enforcement provision recognizes an
"affirmative defense to any legal action brought under th[e statute]" if
the health-care provider can show "that the economic viability of the
"984facility or practice would be jeopardized by compliance ....
These laws in turn overlap indirectly with another health-care enti-
tlement program: the state's Medicaid program, or MaineCare. Through
this program Maine subsidizes the costs of treating certain low-income
patients via payments to hospitals and other health-care providers." The
free-care guidelines limit the obligation to provide free care to enrollees
in public programs, such as MaineCare, so that only "any amount
remaining due after payment by the insurer or medical assistance pro-
gram will be considered free care."86
A nonprofit acute-care hospital situated in one of Maine's poorest
counties," Franklin Memorial Hospital saw the costs of treating low-
§§ 1.01-.10 (LexisNexis 2007). Free care is defined as a "service provided without expectation of
payment from, or on behalf of, the individual receiving the hospital services." § 1.01(C).
79. § 1.01(A).
80. § 1.03.
81. tit. 22, § 1716.
82. Id. § 1715(1).
83. Id. § 1715(2).
84. Id. § 1715(2)(D). The statute as written appears to limit a hospital to raising an economic-
viability defense only during administrative or judicial review. See id.
85. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 2009). Although not
obligatory by law, all Maine hospitals participate in MaineCare. Id. at 130. As part of its health-
care overhaul, Maine expanded MaineCare eligibility so that now almost a quarter of the state's
population is enrolled in the program. Harris, supra note 14.
86. 10-144-150 ME. CODE R. § 1.05(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
87. Average household income in Franklin County is one of the lowest county averages in
Maine. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *2 (D. Me. Sept.
24, 2008). The average per family income there is about 160 percent of the Federal Poverty
Guidelines. Id.
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income patients increase steadily in recent years. The hospital spent
$131,280 on mandatory free care in 2004; $661,000 in 2007; and
$890,212 during the first eleven months of the 2008 fiscal year." With
respect to MaineCare reimbursement, Franklin likewise bore a financial
burden. The hospital in 2007 received $2,645.95 on average from the
state for each patient discharged after receiving inpatient services, even
though the cost for such patient care was generally about $4796.9 The
MaineCare reimbursement rate for outpatient services was more
favorable to Franklin, but it still covered only about ninety percent of the
hospital's outpatient costs.90
All told, Franklin's obligations under MaineCare and Maine's free-
care laws were burdensome enough to induce the hospital to seek relief
against the state in federal court. The hospital claimed that it suffered
uncompensated takings under Maine's free-care laws and also under
MaineCare's reimbursement arrangement." In response, Maine Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Commissioner Brenda M. Harvey
filed a motion to dismiss Franklin's takings claim regarding MaineCare
reimbursement, which the district court granted because of Franklin's
voluntary participation therein.92 The parties then filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the free-care takings claim.9 3 Following the rec-
ommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court granted Harvey's
motion for summary judgment.94 Franklin appealed to the First Circuit.95
On review, the First Circuit focused mainly on Franklin's takings
challenge to Maine's free-care laws. As an initial step, the court noted
that Maine's free-care laws, which do "not directly appropriate FMH's
property but rather regulate[ ] how FMH may use it, [are] properly ana-
lyzed under the law of regulatory takings, not the law of physical tak-
88. Id. For an itemized breakdown of how much money Franklin spent per patient and on the
goods and services that it supplied per patient, see Franklin Mem'l, 2008 WL 441612, at * 1. Note
that in 2007 regulators raised the income qualification for free care from 100 percent of the
Federal Poverty Guidelines to 150 percent of the guidelines. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 123 n.1;
§ 1.02(C); see also Annual Update of the Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4199-04 (Jan. 23, 2009). As a result of this income change, Franklin's free-care patients
increased from 127 people in 2006 to 238 people in 2007. Franklin Mem 'l, 2008 WL 441612, at
*2.
89. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 124.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 124-25. Franklin pursued its takings claims under both the U.S. and Maine
Constitutions. Franklin Mem'l, 2008 WL 4416412, at *11. In its order against the hospital, the
district court dismissed without prejudice the takings claims under the latter. Franklin Mem'l
Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4936403, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 14, 2008).
92. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 125.
93. Id.
94. Franklin Mem'l, 2008 WL 4936403, at *1.
95. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 125.
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ings."9 6 In deciding first whether a per se taking had occurred, the court
quickly determined that Lucas was inapposite because the hospital did
not allege that the state had deprived it of all economically beneficial
uses of its property, but only "that it face[d] higher operating costs as a
result of the free care laws."9
As to whether Loretto was applicable, the court examined Frank-
lin's argument that it had been subjected to a government-sanctioned
physical invasion resembling that in Loretto because it was required to
"give its real property (hospital rooms) away for free . . . [and to] give
away its personal property to the extent that it must purchase and freely
provide expensive medicines and supplies to low income patients."9 8
Thus, according to the court, "in FMH's view, Maine's free care laws
are not a form of price control but instead direct the transfer of property
from the hospitals to low income patients." 99 The court then cited to a
case that did concern a price control, Yee v. City of Escondido,' in
which the Supreme Court held that a rent-control ordinance to which
mobile-home parks were subjected did not effect an appropriation under
Loretto of park owners' property."o1 In that case, the Court concluded
that the ordinance did not facially require the park owners to continue
renting their land as a mobile-home park; thus, because the park owners
were free to exclude others from their property if they ceased using it as
a mobile-home park, the ordinance did not compel unwanted tenants'
invasion of the park owners' land.' 02 By analogy, the First Circuit rea-
soned, Franklin was required to admit patients only as long as it used its
property as a hospital; "it may choose to stop using its property as a
hospital, which is what makes it subject to Maine's free care laws.""o'
Loretto consequently was of no benefit to the hospital.
Next, the court applied the Penn Central factors, starting with the
economic-impact factor.'"' Franklin maintained that the actual economic
impact of Maine's free-care laws was severe, noting that it had expended
considerable sums of money on the average free-care inpatient and that
its free-care burden had increased nearly fivefold since income-eligibil-
ity changes in 2007.105 It also argued that the structure of the laws was
such that the state could confiscate a "significant and potentially unlim-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 126.
98. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id.
100. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
101. Franklin Men'l, 575 F.3d at 126 (citing Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-28).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 127.
105. Id.
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ited" amount of the hospital's goods and services.' 06 The court did not
suggest that Franklin's expenditures were insubstantial, but it did remark
that these sums were small in proportion to Franklin's gross revenues
and that in 2007, for example, the $661,000 that the hospital spent on
mandatory free care totaled only 0.51 percent of its annual gross reve-
nues.' 7 Further, the court concluded that the statutory escape clause,
which gives hospitals an affirmative defense in enforcement proceedings
if their "economic viability" is in jeopardy, ameliorated the potentially
unconstitutional effects of the free-care laws. 0 8
In regard to the investment-backed expectations factor, the court
first dealt with Harvey's argument that the hospital, as a nonprofit entity,
had no such expectations, thus eliminating this as a factor.' 09 The court
"disagree[d] very much with Harvey's categorical approach," reasoning
that even nonprofit institutions like Franklin may acquire property with
expectations about its use."10 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged, the
pervasive regulation of the hospital industry tempered Franklin's, or any
hospital's, investment-backed expectations."
Lastly, the court observed that "[t]he third Penn Central factor-
the character of the government action-strongly favors finding no tak-
ing here."12 Maine's free-care laws merely adjusted the "benefits and
burdens of economic life," leaving the "core rights of [Franklin's] prop-
erty ownership intact."' " More precisely, the laws allowed Franklin to
fashion the details of its free-care policy as long it respected the overrid-
ing income eligibility rules.l 14 "[O]n these facts," the court concluded,
"we hold that Maine's free care laws do not effect a taking.""'
The court then analyzed Franklin's takings challenge to its reim-
106. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
107. Id. at 124.
108. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1715(2)(D) (2004)). Notably, the court left open
the resolution of future objections to Maine's free-care laws in circumstances where a litigant
could show that free-care compliance does jeopardize a hospital's economic viability. Id. at 127 &
n.6. Also notably, the court took issue with the magistrate judge's speculation that the revenue that
Franklin received from other public programs should be a consideration in weighing the economic
impact of Maine's free-care laws. Id. at 127. "This factor is not relevant to the question of whether
Maine's free care laws constitute a taking," the court stated, "and plays no part in our analysis."
Id. Contra Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *10 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008) ("It is not difficult to imagine, for example, that Franklin Memorial's revenue
from other public programs . . . exceeds the financial burden imposed by Maine's Free Care
Laws.").
109. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 127.
110. Id. at 128.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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bursement rate under MaineCare." 6 Anticipating that its voluntary par-
ticipation in the program would defeat its claim, Franklin mounted a
challenge to the combined impact of Maine's free-care laws and Maine-
Care.1 17 The hospital argued that the regulatory guideline that compels a
hospital to deliver care to MaineCare-insured patients, without any
charges beyond the payment under MaineCare, in effect "require[s] that
if a hospital opts out of MaineCare, it must pay [under the free-care
laws] the entire cost of treating patients who are eligible for Maine-
Care.""' Therefore, in Franklin's perspective, its MaineCare participa-
tion was involuntary because the choice "between receiving inadequate
reimbursement by participating in MaineCare or receiving no reimburse-
ment" was no choice at all." 9
Harvey, however, put forth a different interpretation of her
agency's regulation.' 20 Under this reading, the regulatory provision stip-
ulated that "if a hospital did not accept coverage from a particular
insurer or government program, it could still obtain compensation by
billing the patient directly for up to the amount that would be covered by
the insurer or medical assistance program."' 2 ' Thus, in accordance with
this reading, which the court accepted, the state did not pressure Frank-
lin with any "coercive financial incentive to participate in Maine-
Care."' 22 Holding that Franklin's participation in the program was
accordingly voluntary, the court rejected its taking challenge and left
open whether, on Franklin's interpretation of its MaineCare and free-
care mandates, MaineCare participation would be involuntary.' 23 On a
final note, the court stated that "FMH's objection to Maine's free care
laws and MaineCare program is a dispute with the policy choices made
by the state's political branches. As such, FMH's better course of action
is to seek redress through the state's political process."124
IV. THE ROLE OF NONPROFIT OR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONAL
STATUS UNDER PENN CENTRAL
Much of the First Circuit's application of Penn Central to Franklin
Memorial Hospital's free-care takings claim is uncontroversial. In sug-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see 10-144-150 ME. CODE R. § 1.05(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).




123. Id. The word "coercive" in this instance suggests that, had the court agreed with
Franklin's interpretation of the regulation, it also would have agreed with its claim that its
participation in MaineCare was involuntary.
124. Id.
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gesting that Maine's free-care laws, which consumed only .51 percent of
the hospital's gross revenues in 2007, did not produce a sufficiently
severe economic impact on Franklin, the Franklin Memorial court was
well within the bounds of Penn Central. As the magistrate judge sum-
marized, "[insofar as the inquiry is designed to identify regulations that
impose burdens functionally equivalent to a 'classic' taking (i.e., a tak-
ing on par with total condemnation), the economic impact at issue . .. is
simply not significant enough to independently compel a finding that the
Free Care Laws work a taking."' 25 In discussing the character of the
government-action factor from Penn Central, moreover, the First Circuit
could declare confidently that this factor "strongly favors finding no tak-
ing" because Maine's free-care laws did not amount to a physical inva-
sion by government but rather, as a quintessential health-care regulation,
to a "public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good."l 26
The second Penn Central factor, however-the investment-backed
expectations of a takings claimant-raised a curious sub-issue that the
First Circuit had to respond to before moving forward with its analysis:
whether Franklin's status as a nonprofit hospital affected, or altogether
cancelled, any such expectations. Looking to Maine nonprofit law,
which gives nonprofit corporations rights to acquire, own, use, improve,
and convey property, 12 7 the court easily rejected Harvey's categorical
proposal to negate any investment-backed expectations that Franklin
may have by virtue of its nonprofit status.128 The court was sound in
doing so because this proposition, by narrowly equating investment-
backed expectations with profits, would broadly exclude takings claims
by a party simply because of how it is incorporated. Such a result would
not be in the spirit of Penn Central's ad hoc, fact-intensive approach.
The more difficult issue was Harvey's alternative argument regard-
ing the effect of Franklin's nonprofit, charitable status on its challenge to
Maine's free-care laws. In addition to her categorical argument, Harvey
implored the court to "adopt a new test for charitable organizations,
which finds a taking only where the regulation interferes with the organ-
125. Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *5 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)).
126. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 128-29 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); cf William S. Brewbaker III, Commentary, Health Care Price
Controls and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669, 696 (1994) (concluding that
national health-reform legislation is "clearly" a public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good and, as such, would not require government
compensation to adversely affected parties).
127. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 202(l)(I) (2004).
128. See Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 127-28.
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ization's charitable purpose."l2 Without elaborating on its reasoning,
the court simply declined, by way of a footnote, the invitation to adopt
this standard.' 30
The First Circuit's disposal of Harvey's alternative argument is
important because it may have created a federal circuit split on the issue
of the Penn Central test as applied to a nonprofit or charitable institu-
tion. In St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York,'"' the Second
Circuit dealt with this issue in a dispute between the historic St. Barthol-
omew's Church and the same regulatory body against which the Penn
Central Terminal litigated in Penn Central: the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission. Conjuring similar arguments, the
church alleged that the commission's designation of "landmark" over
the church's main house of worship and an adjacent church building
prevented the church from razing the latter building to erect a large-scale
office tower and thus amounted to a taking.132 The situation was differ-
ent from Penn Central, however, in that the takings claimant was incor-
porated under New York law as a nonprofit religious corporation; and
the church used the property in question not for commercial purposes, as
did the owners of the Penn Central Terminal, but for various charitable
purposes, such as feeding, clothing, and sheltering the poor.' 33
In considering the church's takings claim, the district court adopted
a standard that practically mirrors the standard that the First Circuit
rejected in Franklin Memorial: An unconstitutional taking occurs
"where the landmark designation [of a charity's property] would prevent
or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose of
the institution."' 34 The court explained that the Penn Central factors
"must be evaluated in light of the overriding rule that the Fifth Amend-
ment contemplates continued use of a property as it was used in the past,
and thus permits no substantial interference with the property owner's
primary investment expectations or reasonable beneficial use." 35 The
charitable-takings standard, moreover, embodies a view that "[w]hile the
concept of legitimate investment expectation is not directly transferable
to a charitable or religious institution, the concepts of reasonable benefi-
129. Id. at 128 n.7.
130. Id.
131. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
132. Id. at 356.
133. Id. at 351.
134. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990). The district court adopted this standard from New York state-
court decisions. See Soc'y for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925 (N.Y. 1980);
Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, 311 (N.Y. 1974); accord Canisius
Coll. v. City of Buffalo, 629 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (App. Div. 1995).
135. St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966.
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cial use and the owner's primary expectations are equally applicable to
both."l 36 On appeal, the Second Circuit approved this standard and
framed the takings inquiry as "whether the land-use regulation impairs
the continued operation of the property in its originally expected use."'
As long as St. Bartholomew's Church could continue its existing chari-
table and religious activities in the structure that complemented the main
house of worship, the court held, the landmark law did not effect an
unconstitutional taking."' The court acknowledged that the deprivation
of commercial value that the church would gain in rebuilding its
landmarked structure was "palpable," but resolved that this was accept-
able under Penn Central.13 9
The St. Bartholomew's courts-and Commissioner Harvey in her
argument before the First Circuit-offer a sensible modification of Penn
Central when a takings claimant is a nonprofit or charitable organiza-
tion. Rather than deviate radically from Penn Central, the charitable-
takings standard recognizes that a takings claimant's expectations
regarding its property will differ depending on whether the claimant has
used-and under its organizational form, will use-the property for
charitable or commercial purposes. Although the First Circuit appeared
expressly to rebuff this standard, its language elsewhere seems to
acknowledge the relevance of Franklin's nonprofit status. "To the extent
that Maine's free care laws may force FMH to use its property in ways
that it would not otherwise," the court held, "they may interfere with
FMH's investment-backed expectations."I4 0 This language resembles
the inverse of the Second Circuit's holding in St. Bartholomew's that
"[s]o long as the Church can continue to use its property in the way that
it has been using it-to house its charitable and religious activity-there
is no unconstitutional taking."141
In any event, the First Circuit did not explicitly determine whether
Maine's free-care laws in fact disrupted Franklin's investment-backed
expectations so as to "force FMH to use its property in ways that it
would not otherwise." The magistrate judge, on the other hand, did deal
with this claim: Because Franklin had been operating for years under
Maine's free-care laws and because it had a "non-profit health care mis-
sion," it understood prospectively that a "portion of the medical supplies
it purchases and a portion of the time that its staff expends on patients
136. Id.
137. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356.
138. Id. at 357.
139. Id.
140. Franklin Mern'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 2009).
141. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 357.
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simply will not produce a return on investment." 42 In other words,
Maine's free-care laws did not force Franklin to use its property in ways
that it would not have used them otherwise because (1) the regulatory
regime had sufficiently shaped over time how the hospital used its prop-
erty; and (2) even if the regime were not in place, as a "public-benefit
charity, with community health as its mission," the hospital would con-
tinue to supply free care.' 43
In total, both the charitable-takings standard and the First Circuit's
"forced use" standard lead to the same conclusion under the facts of
Franklin Memorial-that the investment-backed expectations factor
from Penn Central does not support a finding that Maine's free-care
laws effectuated a taking of Franklin's property. Ultimately, either stan-
dard could prove arduous to meet for nonprofit hospitals that in the
future might challenge mandatory free-care requirements on a takings
theory. As the Franklin Memorial magistrate judge pointed out, these
hospitals presumably would make available some level of free care
despite such requirements (for example, to earn their federal income tax
exemption); thus, a court might doubt whether mandatory free-care obli-
gations fundamentally change how a hospital "uses" its property. Even
so, some limitations would still exist. A nonprofit hospital that must
relinquish, for example, all, or virtually all, of its resources for
mandatory free care probably would not have to relinquish the same
amount under other internalized or externally imposed obligations, such
as the "community benefit" standard that the IRS uses to measure non-
profit hospitals' tax exemption. In such a scenario, the hospital would
have to, in the words of the First Circuit, "use its property in ways that it
would not otherwise" and would accordingly experience an interference
with its investment-backed expectations.
V. BEYOND PENN CENTRAL: AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF
FRANKLIN MEMORIAL
As the magistrate judge in Franklin Memorial commented, Frank-
lin Memorial "presents a novel question that is not easily resolved by
142. Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *4 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008).
143. Id. at *8. The magistrate judge added that, even if Maine's free-care laws had not
influenced Franklin's expectations about specific supplies and labor, "Franklin Memorial
expresses only a desire to collect some fraction of what it would ordinarily charge for supplies and
services, without expressing or quantifying any expectation of actually profiting from these items
in the absence of the Free Care Laws." Id. at *5. But cf St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 357
(rejecting as irrelevant St. Bartholomew's attempt to distinguish Penn Central on the ground that
the church's desired use of its property would yield only an estimated six percent return).
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resort to existing precedent."" Hence, the novelty of this case allows
for a deeper analysis of the issues that the First Circuit did not focus on,
but which might arise in future takings actions against free-care laws
and other public health-care entitlements. In particular, the First Cir-
cuit's insinuation that Franklin Memorial Hospital could have construed
Maine's free-care laws as a form of price control1 4 5 offers the opportu-
nity to build on earlier scholarship that investigated health-care price
controls under the Takings Clause. To this end, the court's opinion
invites discussion whether the Constitution would require free-care laws,
interpreted as a price control, to guarantee just compensation.
The analysis in this section comprises several subparts. Subpart A
explores how courts have resolved takings claims against price controls.
With Franklin Memorial as the reference point, Subpart B submits a
framework to conceptualize Maine's free-care laws as a price control
that warrants Takings Clause scrutiny. Reaching the same final conclu-
sion as the First Circuit-that Franklin Memorial Hospital's free-care
takings claim would fail-Subpart C presents a different standard from
that of Penn Central to review Maine's free-care laws, construed as a
price control, under the Takings Clause.
A. Price Controls, the "Fair Return" Standard, and Takings Law
Takings cases involving price controls on a program or activity
trigger different constitutional standards than those that the Supreme
Court uses in its regulatory-takings cases, such as Penn Central, Loretto,
and Lucas. In the particularized context of public utility rate-setting,
courts apply what is known as the "fair return" standard. Under this
standard, "Ir]ates which enable [a] company to operate successfully, to
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its
investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid
.... "146 For constitutional purposes the impact of the rate is ultimately
important, not its methodology; "[i]f the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an
end."1 47
The standard of review, however, for price controls of firms other
than public utilities remains an unresolved question. Because the
Supreme Court has not explicitly provided an answer, scholarly discus-
sion has transpired over whether the Penn Central test or the fair-return
144. Franklin Mem'l, 2008 WL 4416412, at *Il.
145. Because the court never examined the potential argument that Maine's free-care laws are
a form of price control, a future plaintiff presumably could make such an argument. See Franklin
Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 126.
146. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
147. Id. at 602.
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standard is the appropriate rule to gauge takings claims regarding non-
utility price controls. As in Yee, which the Franklin Memorial court
cited approvingly, many courts have been able to avoid this discussion
by looking to one dispositive fact: whether a party is legally free to
withdraw from the price-controlled market. With respect to price con-
trols covering health-care providers under public-entitlement programs,
this bar has defeated numerous takings claims against rate regulation
under Medicare, among other administrative systems.' 8
Illustrative of these cases is Minnesota Association of Health Care
Facilities, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare.14 9 At issue
was a state statute that limited the rates that nursing homes that received
federal Medicaid money could charge non-Medicaid residents for ser-
vices.1 50 The appellants, the Minnesota Association of Health Care
Facilities, Inc. and other health-care providers, claimed that the rate lim-
itation on non-Medicaid residents, in combination with an already insuf-
ficient reimbursement rate for Medicaid residents, was an
uncompensated taking of their property."5 ' The appellants urged the
court to examine the scheme of reimbursement under the fair-return
standard.152 The court responded that "cases concerning public utilities
are inapposite, however, because . . . Minnesota nursing homes, unlike
public utilities, have freedom to decide whether to remain in business
and thus subject themselves voluntarily to the limits imposed by Minne-
sota on the return they obtain from investment of their assets in nursing
home operation." 15 The court further discarded the appellants' interpre-
tation of voluntariness, whereby market realities made their participation
in Medicaid practically involuntary.1'5 Because it disposed the takings
claim on these grounds, the court avoided the need to determine the
applicability of the fair-return standard outside public-utility rate
cases.155
Somewhat in contrast to the court in Minnesota Association of
Health Care Facilities, Inc., the court in Calloway Community Hospital
v. Sullivan15 6 suggested that it could have continued to a constitutional
148. See, e.g., Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 915-18 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
anesthesiologists' takings challenge to a statutory scheme that limited physician charges under
Medicare Part B); Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting physicians'
takings challenge to a statutory scheme that froze physician charges under Medicare Part B).
149. 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 444-45.
151. Id. at 445.
152. Id. at 446.
153. Id. (citation omitted).
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. 784 F. Supp 693 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
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takings standard because the Medicare participation of the plaintiff-hos-
pitals was involuntary to the extent that they had to participate to obtain
federal dollars for capital expenditures under the Hill-Burton Act.' The
plaintiffs contended that they lost money under Medicare's Prospective
Payment System,' 5 8 which infringed the Takings Clause.159 Discussing
applicable law, the court cited the Penn Central factors,' 6 0 while noting
that "[i]n another context, government review of electrical power rates,
the Supreme Court has held that rate setting is not an exact science, but
that there is a range of just and reasonable rates."' 6 1 The court found,
however, that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence "to
demonstrate a nexus between the PPS reimbursement rates and their
declining PPS margins," suggesting that, if the hospitals had furnished
more concrete proof of their financial losses, they might have been able
to show that they had suffered an unconstitutional taking.162
B. Free Care and Price Controls
Before the Franklin Memorial court even could have gotten to the
point of deciding whether to extend the fair-return standard from public-
utility rate cases, it presumably would have explained how Maine's free-
care laws are a form of price control. Maine's free-care laws, though, are
not explicitly a price control in the same way as the laws at issue in
Minnesota Association of Health Care Facilities, Inc. or the rate-setting
under a program like Medicaid. The first question is thus how to deter-
mine whether a regulation effectively equals a price control. Professor
Merrill, in discussing physician price controls, proposes this two-part
test:
The ... inquiry is whether a proposal calls for government action that
causes prices to fall or to rise less rapidly. This inquiry, in turn, can
be broken down into two subsidiary questions: (1) whether there is
governmental action, and (2) whether that action causes a moderation
157. 42 U.S.C. § 291(a)-(o-1) (2006). The Hill-Burton Act was a major construction program
through which hospitals received federal grants in exchange for rendering free or reduced care.
See SEARCH FOR FREE HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 15, at 43. Although participation in the Hill-
Burton program itself was voluntary, the Calloway court did not treat this as dispositive in
addressing the hospitals' takings claim, focusing instead exclusively on their mandated Medicare
participation.
158. A prospective-payment system formulates a predetermined fee for a service provider,
generally disregarding the actual cost of the provider's service. Calloway, 784 F. Supp. at 696.
159. Id. at 694-95.
160. Id. at 698 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986)).
161. Id. (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278 (1976)).
162. Id. at 698-99 ("For instance, if plaintiffs had shown that a typical appendectomy or a
typical acute-care room costs 'X' dollars but that the PPS reimbursed them at a lesser amount,
then the Court might conclude that plaintiffs suffered a significant monetary loss, an
unconstitutional taking.").
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in the rise of prices.163
Maine's free-care laws clearly constitute governmental action
because they require the provision of free care under threat of state sanc-
tion. As to the second question, these laws caused a moderation in the
rise of prices in Franklin Memorial in that they altogether barred Frank-
lin Memorial Hospital from charging patients who qualified under the
free-care laws-or, put another way, they imposed a price of zero dol-
lars for the care that the hospital rendered for eligible patients. This
"cap" was directly contrary to the wishes of Franklin, which expressed
the "desire to negotiate contracts for [free] care that would, on average,
serve to recoup some portion of its costs.""
Assuming that Maine's free-care laws could be understood as a
price control, the "second general question [is] whether these price con-
trols trigger scrutiny under the Takings Clause."' Professor Merrill
synthesizes from Supreme Court case law "two distinct understandings
for answering this . . . question, although they are not recognized as
alternatives or identified by name": the legal-obligation theory and the
specific-capital theory.166 Pursuant to the former theory, a takings issue
arises from a price control only where the government obliges a private
entity to offer its products or services to the public at a government-
scheduled price, and the entity cannot legally exit the controlled mar-
ket.'67 This theory supports courts' sometimes evasive responses to
arguments that the government practically forces a party to offer its
price-subjugated products or services to the public, as in Minnesota
Association of Health Care Facilities, Inc. where the court asserted that,
"[d]espite the strong financial inducement to participate in Medicaid, a
nursing home's decision to do so is nonetheless voluntary."168 When the
163. Thomas W. Merrill, Commentary, Constitutional Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 663-64 (1994); see id. at 636 (remarking that, although "[t]he
specific focus is on physician price controls ... much of the analysis applies to other health care
providers as well").
164. Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *8 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008). In particular, Franklin wanted to recoup money for "free care to individuals who
have substantial wealth, but little income." Id. at *2. Maine's free-care laws created something of
a loophole whereby "hospitals like Franklin Memorial [must] provide free care to individuals who
have sufficient assets to pay for all or part of their care, because capital gains, cash deposits or
savings, and other property assets are not factored into the Department's income qualification
guidelines." Id.; 10-144-150 ME. CODE R. § 1.02(A)(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2007); see also infra Part
V.C (describing the degree to which Franklin Memorial Hospital claimed that it would provide
free care to low-income patients absent Maine's free-care laws).
165. Merrill, supra note 163, at 665.
166. Id. at 639.
167. Id. at 639-40.
168. Minn. Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442,
446 (8th Cir. 1984).
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First Circuit in Franklin Memorial discussed price controls as they
related to Yee and Loretto, it stated similarly that "FMH is not required
to serve low income patients; it may choose to stop using its property as
a hospital, which is what makes it subject to Maine's free care laws."' 9
From Franklin Memorial Hospital's perspective, of course, this option
surely would be unimaginable, as would be withdrawing from
MaineCare.
Although "as the law presently stands, economic hardship is not
equivalent to legal compulsion for purposes of takings analysis,"' the
law has experienced some fissures. In Yee, the mobile-home park own-
ers argued that changing the use of their property was highly implausi-
ble."' Rather than categorically rejecting this position, the Supreme
Court said merely that, because the property owners had not run the
statutory gauntlet for changing the use of a mobile-home park, it would
confine its review to the face of the statute.'72 But the Court hypothe-
sized that "[a] different case would be presented were the statute, on its
face or as applied, to compel a landowner over objection to rent his
property or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy."13 Like-
wise, in a case in which gasoline wholesalers and refiners attacked price
controls on gasoline in Puerto Rico, the First Circuit itself looked skepti-
cally upon the argument that the gasoline wholesalers could avoid losses
under the controls by abstaining from selling gasoline: "This supposed
freedom to temporarily leave the market," the court said, "may be
largely illusory . . . .""7
Professor Merrill's second theory, the specific-capital theory, may
be more useful to a hospital challenging Maine's free-care laws as a
price control and getting past the freedom-to-withdraw bar. This theory
posits that a takings issue emerges when a private entity has invested
capital in a market subject to a price control, and that capital has little or
no value in any alternative use; in other words, the theoretical ability to
169. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 2009).
170. Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1993).
171. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Tenoco Oil Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1027 n.21 (1st Cir.
1989). In another case concerning price controls on rice imports in Puerto Rico, the First Circuit
expressed similar reservations:
It is ordinarily true that a member of an industry which is under price control can
withdraw from the field and thus avoid control. But it is wholly unrealistic to apply
this principle to the case before us. For the rice importers supply Puerto Rico with
the most important staple in the diet of the people. . . . Accordingly the application
of the principle that the members of the industry could escape loss by withdrawing
from the business of importing rice is not an honest answer to the question at issue.
Mora v. Meijas, 223 F.2d 814, 817 (1st Cir. 1955).
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leave the price-controlled market is not dispositive.175 Professor Merrill
marshals a convincing argument that "[t]here can be little doubt that
price controls on physicians should be subject to the Takings Clause
under the specific capital theory" because of the major investments that
they make in their medical education and other outlays, which would
have negligible value outside of medicine.'1 6 Despite the Franklin
Memorial court's suggestion to the contrary, there can be no doubt, then,
that mandatory free-care laws operating on hospitals like Franklin
Memorial Hospital, which by virtue of their fixed infrastructure cannot
simply relocate to another geographic or product market to flee their
free-care obligations, satisfy this standard.177
Thus far, this line of reasoning establishes only that Franklin
Memorial Hospital's alleged freedom to discontinue its use as a hospital
would not have resolved its takings claim against Maine's free-care laws
if it had argued in Franklin Memorial that they were a price control. A
legal standard is still necessary to judge the constitutionality of these
laws under the Takings Clause. 7 Two main options exist: the mul-
tifactor test from Penn Central or the fair-return standard from public-
utility rate cases.17 9 Application of the Penn Central test to a hypotheti-
cal Franklin Memorial in which the court assessed Maine's free-care
laws as a price control would produce an analysis that would largely
mirror the analysis that the First Circuit actually rendered and the addi-
tional considerations that Part IV put forth. The following analysis,
therefore, is limited to examining Maine's free-care laws, construed as
price control, under the fair-return standard from public-utility rate
cases.
C. Free Care, Price Controls, and the "Fair Return" Standard
A prerequisite to the inquiry of whether Maine's free-care laws
would hold up against the fair-return standard is whether this standard is
applicable outside the traditionally understood public-utility rate con-
text. The scholars diverge at this juncture; whereas Professor Brewbaker
proffers that "it is the nature of the utility enterprise and of utility regula-
tion, and not the presence of price controls, that is constitutionally sig-
nificant,""so Professor Merrill stresses that "the fair return standard is
designed for the specific purpose of assessing the constitutionality of
175. Merrill, supra note 163, at 640.
176. Id. at 650.
177. See id. at 640.
178. Id. at 653.
179. Id.
180. Brewbaker, supra note 126, at 704.
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price controls."' 8 ' A conception of what is a utility and why it is subject
to a constitutional takings standard distinct from that in other takings
cases necessarily infuses this debate. Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz offer
a useful definition of the classic public utility as a "business engaged in
providing goods or services so essential to communal and economic life
that securing their adequate supply is ultimately a government responsi-
bility." 8 2 According to these authors, compulsion to provide the essen-
tial goods or services "lies at the heart of the classic utility regime," and
this compulsion may exist in de jure or de facto form. 8" Like Professor
Brewbaker, Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz further underscore the nature
of utilities as inseparable from the fair-return standard, reasoning that
the Takings Clause is concerned fundamentally about government
appropriation and that, as a system of government-compelled produc-
tion, a utility regime inherently appropriates, and thus for constitutional
purposes, takes, a utility's capital.184
The expandability of the fair-return standard need be addressed
only narrowly in this casenote. Although "[t]here is an increasing ten-
dency to use the word 'utility' loosely in referring to many different
kinds of regulation covering a wide range of businesses,"'8 5 those pri-
marily accountable under Maine's free-care laws-hospitals-are in
effect utilities in ways that most businesses are not. Therefore, the
proper standard in challenges to these laws, interpreted as price controls,
is the fair-return standard rather than the Penn Central test. Hospitals,
like other public utilities, provide integral community services, often
exercise monopoly-like reach over a certain geographic area, invest sig-
nificant capital on fixed infrastructure, and function under extensive reg-
ulation.' 86 In underlining the government compulsion that characterizes
utilities, Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz argue that "[a] legal duty to serve
and a restriction on the right to exit are hallmarks of utility systems";8
according to this argument, then, hospitals bear further indicia of a typi-
cal utility. In the face of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
181. Merrill, supra note 163, at 654.
182. William P. Barr, Henry Weissmann & John P. Frantz, The Gild That Is Killing the Lily:
How Confusion over Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the
Takings Clause, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 439 (2005).
183. Id. at 440-42; see also Walter Pond, The Law Governing the Fixing of Public Utility
Rates: A Response to Recent Judicial and Academic Misconceptions, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5
(1989).
184. Barr, Weissmann & Frantz, supra note 182, at 436-48.
185. Id. at 438.
186. Tammy Lundstrom, Note, Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare
Hospitalizations as an Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1243,
1254 (2005).
187. Barr, Weissmann & Frantz, supra note 182, at 491.
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Labor Act, state laws that impose a legal duty on hospitals to provide
emergency care, and free-care laws, hospitals indeed face numerable
legal duties to serve. Moreover, hospitals are usually not at liberty to exit
a market on their own terms. Lengthy and exhaustive administrative pro-
cedures substantially may limit this right.'"
Thus, the question of whether Maine's free-care laws actually
would pass muster under the fair-return standard finally emerges. In
other words, do these laws prohibit a fair return on a hospital's reasona-
ble costs and prudential investment? In the seminal case in articulating
the fair-return standard, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., the Supreme Court, in upholding a utility rate regulation under
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, stated that "[r]ates which enable [a] com-
pany to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract
capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly
cannot be condemned as invalid . . . ."18 The Court elaborated further
that "[i]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If
the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreason-
able, judicial inquiry . .. is at an end."190
Determining what exactly the Court meant with its reference to the
"total effect" of a rate has proved contentious. Professor Drobak, for
example, maintains that the "total effect" test constitutionally allows sig-
nificant financial harm to utility investors if the harm is in the public
interest.191 He offers as examples of such justifiable harm "utility rates
that will generate below normal returns to the owners of the utility's
common stock, or . .. rates that fail temporarily to provide any common
equity earnings . . . ."'9 Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz, by contrast, start
from the premise that the government must compensate a utility for
appropriated capital and argue that the government's right to require
fluctuation of rates is conditioned on its responsibility to permit the util-
ity to generate offsetting revenue.' 9 3 They add that such offsetting reve-
nue streams may not include revenues that a utility earned in a market
open to competition because those revenues are compensation for the
utility's risk in participating in that market.' "In simpler terms, the
government could not compel General Motors to sell Chevrolets to the
188. See, e.g., HEALTH PLANNING DEP'T, N.J. HosP. Ass'N, HOSPITAL CLOSURE GUIDELINES:
BEST PRACTICES FROM THE FIELD (2008) (detailing the hospital-closure process in New Jersey).
189. 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
190. Id. at 602.
191. John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility
Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REv. 65, 67 (1985).
192. Id.
193. Barr, Weissmann & Frantz, supra note 182, at 461.
194. Id. at 462.
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poor below cost because, due to earnings on Cadillacs and Buicks, the
company as a whole remained profitable."' 95
The foregoing theories could have important implications for the
fair-return standard in the free-care context. Recall that in Franklin
Memorial, Franklin Memorial Hospital spent $661,000 in mandatory
free care during 2007, but this amount was only 0.51 percent of the
hospital's gross revenues for that period. 1 96 "Although it would be silly
to suggest"l 97 that this was an insignificant amount of money, "these
expenditures [thus] represent[ed] only a small fraction of FMH's overall
budget."198 The facts were not, as the First Circuit noted, that the hospi-
tal alleged that the "level of free care that it currently provides threatens
its continued economic viability."1 99
Under Professor Drobak's public-interest theory, Maine's free-care
laws, working as a price control, probably could push a hospital like
Franklin to the brink of economic non-viability. This theory, as the pro-
fessor describes, is "extremely broad . . . emcompass[ing] everything
within a government's authority that is related in any way to the regu-
lated firm's business, including the effects of the regulated prices on
customers and society."2 00 Arguably, then, burdensome free-care loads
pursuant to Maine's laws are permissible on the ground that the public
has an interest in seeing that society's most indigent citizens-who may
otherwise lack recourse to health care and who, if left untreated, could
pose public-health threats-have access to free, basic care at hospitals.
Thus, with regard to Franklin Memorial specifically, Professor Drobak's
theory would support its outcome under the preceding framework.
But this theory is vulnerable to criticism. As Professor Drobak con-
cedes, a public-interest theory that lopsidedly favors consumer interests
over investor interests could lead to long-term harm to the public if suf-
ficiently low rates precluded utilities from obtaining capital, induced
delay of capital-intensive construction projects, and contributed to
lower-quality utility services.2 0 1 And, more practically, Professor
Drobak's theory may be too novel for judges and regulators. He
acknowledges that "hundreds, probably thousands, of judicial and
administrative decisions, both state and federal," have understood Hope
195. Id. at 461-62.
196. Franklin Mem'1 Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 2009).
197. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *5 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008).
198. Franklin Mem'l, 575 F.3d at 124.
199. Id.
200. Drobak, supra note 191, at 96.
201. Id. at 124-25.
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to require rates to satisfy only investor interests.202
In this light, Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz's claim-that courts and
regulators should not wait until a utility's financial integrity becomes
compromised to recognize as cognizable a takings claim 2 0 3 -iS more
convincing. The repercussion of this understanding for Franklin Memo-
rial is that the First Circuit's conclusion that Maine's free-care laws did
not jeopardize the "economic viability" of Franklin Memorial Hospital
is insufficient. As one Franklin Memorial commentator observes,
[i]n the utility context .. .the confiscatory rate test is not so low-not
"jeopardizing economic viability," but rather elimination of a "rea-
sonable return" on your investment (or opportunity to earn a reasona-
ble return). . . . [A]t least in theory, takings law in the utility context
requires an opportunity to earn a reasonable return, not just to
survive.
And therein is the reason that a hospital challenging Maine's free-care
laws as a price control might wish to pursue a fair-return utility theory:
A court may more easily find a taking under this theory than under Penn
Central, which has authorized extensive diminutions of property values
that verge close to complete diminution.205
Nevertheless, the facts of Franklin Memorial suggest that the gov-
ernment did not deprive Franklin of a fair return. Looking not to the
hospital's overall budget, which comprises both its free-care and non-
free care business-or, to borrow Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz's anal-
ogy, the sum of Chevrolets, Cadillacs, and Buicks-but rather only to
the hospital's free-care business, is revealing. The magistrate judge in
Franklin Memorial differentiated between these two spheres, recogniz-
ing that the "portion of the medical supplies [that Franklin] purchases
and [the] portion of the time that its staff expends on [free-care]
patients"206 in turn was divisible into mandatory free care under Maine
law and free care that the hospital doled out voluntarily.207 Of these two
types of free care, Franklin provided the latter "above and beyond the
requirements of the Free Care Laws." 208 For the fiscal year 2007, for
example, less than half of the $1,574,000 that the hospital spent on free
202. Id. at 65-66.
203. Barr, Weissmann & Frantz, supra note 182, at 461.
204. Catherine R. Connors, Hospitals, Takings and Reasonable Returns, MAINE APPEALS
BLOG (Aug. 31, 2009, 7:07 PM), http://www.maineappeals.con2009/08/hospitals-and-takings.
html.
205. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-67 (1979) (upholding under Penn Central a
prohibition on the sale of valuable, lawfully acquired eagle feathers).
206. Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *4 (D. Me.
Sept. 24, 2008).
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id. at *4.
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care was mandatory; 20 9 the hospital spent the rest in furtherance of its
"non-profit health care mission."2 1 0
Freed from its mandatory free-care obligation, Franklin in fact
would have continued to provide voluntary care commensurate with or
close to its mandatory share.211 Only then the hospital would have used
a sliding billing schedule based on the Federal Poverty Guidelines to
consider a patient's ability to pay for services. 2 12 Additionally, it would
have used its "contract for care" program to allow low-income patients
to waive the balance of their expected payments by volunteering their
services to the hospital. 213 Franklin, however, would not have provided
free care to "individuals who have substantial wealth, but little
income"214 as a result of how the Maine Department of Health and
Human Services defines "income."2 1 5 Franklin did not specify in such a
situation what kind of return on its investment that it would have real-
ized from its provision of supplies and services to this patient popula-
21tion.16 The magistrate judge deduced, however, that the value of
payments by low-income patients, plus the value of the services that
they might give back under the "contract for care" program, would still
fall short of $661,000.217
In short, this "rate" was not unfair, where Franklin could "operate
successfully, . . . maintain its financial integrity, . . . attract capital, and
. . . compensate its investors"21 8 as a result of the hospital's "return,"
presumably in the form of tax savings and other benefits, on its share of
"voluntary" free care. 2 19 An exact line between "fair" and "unfair" under
these facts may be unascertainable; but presumably, the circumstances
would have to have been such that Franklin's mandatory free-care sub-
stantially exceeded its voluntary free care and upended some aspect of
its investment-backed operations.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id. at *4.
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *2.
215. 10-144-150 ME. CODE R. § 1.02(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2007).
216. Franklin Mem'l., 2008 WL 4416412, at *5.
217. Id. at *5 n.2.
218. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
219. The magistrate judge said as much:
It is not difficult to imagine ... that Franklin Memorial's revenue from other public
programs, or better yet, the profit from such programs, exceeds the financial burden
imposed by Maine's Free Care Laws. Do these various state programs, in the
aggregate, cover, or more than cover, the cost of the related supplies and services? If
so, then is not the public essentially bearing the costs?
Franklin Mem'l, 2008 WL 4416412, at *10.
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In today's health-care marketplace, where demand for free care has
soared to record levels, 220 the previously described circumstances are
not implausible. The strained economic situation with which Minneapo-
lis-based Park Nicollet Health Services has struggled is representative of
the difficult times that hospitals across the United States are facing. The
nonprofit health system has scaled back services and laid off hundreds
of workers as its level of uncompensated care rose from $29 million in
2007 to $43 million in 2008.221 Nationwide, the American Hospital
Association reported that 5010 of its registered community hospitals
spent $36 billion on such care in 2008.222 Although legal regimes may
differ across jurisdictions, and complex issues of causation may thwart
attempts to discern the effects of free care on a hospital's financial
health, these economic realities suggest that hospitals may need the
relief available by using a utility fair-return theory under the Takings
Clause to challenge their free-care obligations.
VI. FREE CARE IN A CHANGING HEALTH-CARE LANDSCAPE
In light of the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, one might think that the charity-care burdens on health-care
providers like Park Nicollet Health Services will eventually be relics of
a bygone era of health care. Broadly speaking, the law purports to bring
into the ranks of the insured an estimated 32 million people by 2019 by
expanding Medicaid eligibility, subsidizing the purchase of private
insurance through regulated health-insurance exchanges, and requiring
most U.S. citizens and legal residents to have health insurance. 223 For
hospitals, a system in which millions more patients are insured means
that the demand for and costs of free care should decrease appreciably,
allowing for reallocation of money that goes toward these expenses. The
Urban Institute estimated that under the Senate's original health-reform
bill,2 24 which served as the backbone of the final legislation, the unin-
sured would decrease from 49.1 million people in 2009 to 23 million
people in 2019, and total uncompensated-care costs would fall from
220. See ECONOMIC CRISIS, supra note 19, at 3.
221. Reed Abelson, Bills Stalled, Hospitals Fear Rising Unpaid Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/health/policy/09hospital.html?scp=1&sq=bills%20
stalled%20hospitals%20fear%20rising%20unpaid%20care&st=cse; Casey Selix, Park Nicollet
Forced to Bring in Outsider to Review Finances, Outline 'Action Steps,' MINNPOST.COM (Apr. 30,
2009, 11:06 AM), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2009/04/30/8468/park-nicollet forced-to_
bringjin outsider to review_finances_outlineactionsteps.
222. UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 25, at 4.
223. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 1 (2010).
224. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (as passed by
Senate, Dec. 24, 2009).
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$62.1 billion to $46.6 billion between 2009 and 2019.225
Without health-care reform, by contrast, the situation could have
been much direr. Based on assumptions about economic recovery,
health-care costs, and insurance premiums, the Urban Institute estimated
that in a worst-case scenario the uninsured would increase from 49.1
million people in 2009 to 65.7 million people in 2019, and uncompen-
sated-care costs would increase from $62.1 billion to $141.4 billion dur-
ing the same period.226 By these measures, then, hospitals stand to
benefit significantly from the passage of the PPACA.22 7
Contrary to perceptions that free care may become irrelevant with
the implementation of the PPACA, however, free care is, and will be for
some time, an important topic in the post-reform landscape. As the
Urban Institute's figures assume, the very need for free care will exist
for years to come. In the short term, key components of the PPACA,
including the disbursement of subsidies to purchase health insurance and
the prohibition on insurers denying health insurance to people with pre-
existing health conditions, will not take effect until 2014.228 Until then,
as long as adverse economic conditions cause more people to lose their
jobs, and thus their health insurance, demand for free care is bound to
increase. 229 Even those who weather the downtrodden economy and
maintain their employment and health insurance may need free care as
their employers pass on increasing health-care costs through higher
deductibles and copayments.230
By 2019, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that, even
with health-reform legislation in place, 23 million people will remain
uninsured,23 1 suggesting that the need for free care will exist in the long
term as well. For one, the PPACA categorically excludes the estimated
225. JOHN HOLAHAN & BOWEN GARRETT, URBAN INST., THE COST OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE
wITH AND WrrHoUT HEALTH REFORM 2-3 (2010). Note that these uncompensated-care costs
account for "underpayment" of Medicaid funds, id. at 1-2, whereas the $36 billion in
uncompensated-care costs that the American Hospital Association reported for 2008 exclude the
underpayment of these funds, UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE, supra note 25, at 1. See AM.
Hosp. Ass'N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET 2 (2009)
("Underpayment is the difference between the costs incurred and the reimbursement received for
delivering care to patients.").
226. HOLAHAN & GARRETT supra note 225, at 2-3.
227. See Reed Abelson, In Health Care Overhaul, Boons for Hospitals and Drug Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/business/22bizhealth.htmlscp=1&
sq=in%20health%20care%20overhaul%20boons%20for%20hospitals&st=cse (describing
hospitals as "clear beneficiaries" of health-reform legislation and having "little to fear" with its
passage).
228. CAROL PRYOR ET AL., CMTY. CATALYST, BEST KEPT SECRETS: ARE NON-PROFIT
HoSPrIALS INFORMING PATIENTS AnouT CHARITY CARE PROGRAMS?, at 5 (2010).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Maggie Mertens, Some Will Remain Uninsured After Reform, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
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11.9 million undocumented immigrants in the United States-a core
group of mostly uninsured, low-income people who rely on free care-
from Medicaid eligibility and participation in the health-insurance
exchanges.23 2 Even for some U.S. citizens, the "devil may be in the
details"23 3 of the statute. Some low- and middle-income people, such as
those who have employer-based health insurance, will be ineligible for
federal subsidies and may find their copayments, deductibles, and pre-
miums difficult to pay, notwithstanding more stringent regulations on
insurance companies.23 4 Moreover, despite not being able to afford pri-
vate health insurance, some of these people also may not qualify for
Medicaid.23 5 Some who do qualify might not enroll anyway because
they are unaware of its availability or find it unnecessary. 23 6 Left in the
shadows of health reform, these groups may continue to depend on the
safety-net institutions that traditionally have served them at free or
reduced rates.
The future of these institutions in the post-reform landscape, how-
ever, is uncertain. Once uninsured patients get health insurance through
Medicaid, for example, they may afford to go to hospitals outside the
safety net.237 Meanwhile, the still uninsured may concentrate at commu-
nity-health centers and public hospitals in search of free care.238 "put.
bluntly, even if we halve the number of insured, the safety net could be
endangered if it simultaneously experiences the exodus of its remaining
insured patients." 239 Another complication is that, despite the potential
for high demand for free care, community health centers and public hos-
pitals may have less money to provide such care. To cover the costs of
insurance subsidies, the PPACA aims to cut a principal funding source
for safety-net hospitals: Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/March/24/Some-Will-Remain-
Uninsured.aspx.
232. See SAMANTHA ARTIGA & JENNIFER TOLBERT, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMMIGRANTS'
HEALTH COVERAGE AND HEALTH REFORM: KEY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (2009); cf Siegel,
Regenstein & Shin, supra note 33, at 428 ("Health reform that excludes undocumented
immigrants ... may be of less benefit to many communities and their safety net providers, where
such immigrants make up a large part of the population."). The CBO calculated that, of the 23
million uninsured people in 2019, about 7 million of them, or one-third, will be undocumented
immigrants. Mertens, supra note 231.
233. Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 33, at 428.
234. See PRYOR ET AL., supra note 228, at 5-6; Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 33, at
428.
235. Mertens, supra note 231.
236. Id.




FREE HOSPITAL CARE AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
funds.24 0
A further question left open in the post-reform landscape concerns
the federal and state tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals. As noted
above, the "community benefit" standard that the IRS uses to assess
nonprofit hospitals' federal tax exemption looks to free care as one suffi-
cient, but not necessary, provision.241 Nevertheless, various governmen-
tal policy signals-such as IRS Form 13790,242 a questionnaire that the
IRS sent to about 600 nonprofit hospitals in May of 2006, in which the
agency asked a number of questions about charity care in evaluating
whether the hospitals were imparting benefits to their communities-
imply that free care has been a salient factor justifying nonprofit hospi-
tals' tax exemption.243 Thus, nonprofit hospitals that experience substan-
tial decreases in their free-care burdens as a result of most of their
patient base being insured may face greater public scrutiny as to whether
other "community benefits," such as medical research and health fairs,
genuinely warrant their tax exemption.2 1 This point bears especial
importance because of the increased willingness of federal, state, and
local governments, which in some cases are desperate in the downturned
economy to collect new tax revenues, to probe-and even to strip-
nonprofit hospitals' tax-exempt status for failure to provide sufficient
free care.24 5
The foregoing uncertainties about the PPACA and current eco-
240. CTry. CATALYST, PROTECT AND TARGET FEDERAL FUNDING FOR SAFETY NET HOSPITALS
1 (2010).
241. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
242. I.R.S. Form 13790 (May 2006).
243. Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the "Community Benefit" Standard, 44
GA. L. REV. 375, 386 (2010).
244. To avert such scrutiny, the hospital industry was strategic in emphasizing during the
deliberation over health-reform legislation that charity care is not the sole pillar of nonprofit
hospitals' federal tax exemption. In response to a proposal by the Senate Finance Committee to
impose an excise tax on nonprofit hospitals if they did not furnish a minimum amount of charity
care, Barbara Martinez, Senators Consider Curtailing Hospitals' Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J., July
10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB124718085849920111 .html, the
American Hospital Association warned that a "formulaic, one-size-fits-all charity care standard
will hamstring hospitals' efforts to respond to community needs," AHA: Schedule H Filings Will
Provide Clearer Picture of Community Benefit, AHANEWS (Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Wash., D.C.), June
8, 2009, available at http://www.ahanews.com/ahanews-app/jsp/display.jspdcrpath=
AHANEWS/AHANewsArticleldata/AHA News_090608_scheduleH&domain=AHANEWS.
When the Senate Finance Committee unveiled the bill, it did not feature the excise-tax measure.
Barbara Martinez, Nonprofit Hospitals Dodge Excise-Tax Bullet in Baucus Bill, WALL ST. J.
HEALTH BLOG (Sept. 16, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/09/16/nonprofit-
hospitals-dodge-excise-tax-bullet-in-baucus-bill/tab/article/. Instead, it laid out four less forceful
requirements, such as a prohibition of "extraordinary collection actions." Id.; see Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 855-57
(2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 501) (incorporating these provisions).
245. See Berg, supra note 243, at 383 nn.36-41 (detailing governmental action).
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nomic realities suggest that policymakers should be flexible in formulat-
ing free-care policies to respond to the different needs of their
constituents. Meanwhile, the federal government should act swiftly in
dispensing guidance about what the provisions of the PPACA regarding
free care require. Pursuant to the statute, the secretary of the Department
of Treasury, for instance, could issue regulations about "what constitutes
reasonable efforts to determine the eligibility of a patient under a finan-
cial assistance policy . . . ."246 The government further could articulate
clear standards for what a financial assistance policy should entail and
the means by which patients may find out about the availability of
assistance. 24 7
In sum, working within the strictures of the PPACA to determine
what a free-care policy should look like in the post-reform landscape
may be a modest starting point, but one that may be preferable to a new
legislative undertaking. As Professors Siegel, Regenstein, and Shin cau-
tion, "after reform, many local and national health care debates may take
on a different tenor, greatly affecting the ability of various actors in the
health care system to argue their respective cases." 248 The debate that
surrounded the PPACA-a debate that is ongoing-was undoubtedly
impassioned and exhausting for both proponents and opponents of the
legislation.24 9 The current political climate thus may hinder actors in the
health-care system from effectively presenting arguments about those
whom health-care reform left behind.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rooted in hospitals' societal role as caregivers, free care is today
less of a solution to the inequalities of health-care access, quality, and
costs rather than it is a symptom of a larger system characterized by
these disparities. Given the recently growing rates at which hospitals
have been providing free care, Franklin Memorial Hospital may prove to
be more than a novelty in citing to the Takings Clause to challenge its
free-care obligations in court. At least with respect to Maine's free-care
laws, however, this casenote lays out the challenges and complexities of
doing so, whether a litigant pursues a regulatory-takings theory or a fair-
return utility theory. As the First Circuit concluded, the political process,
246. § 9007(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(r)(7)).
247. See PRYOR ET AL., supra note 228, at 15.
248. Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 33, at 431.
249. One need only to consider the epithets and gestures, which included spitting and the
displaying of an effigy hanging from a noose, that legislators faced in the build-up to the passage
of the PPACA. See Phillip Rucker & Dan Eggen, Protests at Democrats' Health-Care Events
Spark Political Tug of War, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/08/05/AR2009080502780.html?sid=ST2009080504000.
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on the other hand, may be more responsive to hospitals' concerns about
their free-care burdens. Indeed, the political process has been responsive
to these concerns, and Congress's Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act promises to radically lessen the need for free care. But, as long
as cracks exist into which society's vulnerable populations may
descend-and even the PPACA will not fill every crack-free care will
remain a unique fixture of the U.S. health-care system.
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